Meta problem of consciousness summary A far less extravagant option is to endorse the illusionist response and conclude that the meta-problem is not a meta-problem at all but the problem of consciousness. Mar 27, 2024. Consciousness presents a “hard problem” to scholars. I expressed sympathy with about seven of them as elements of a solutions: introspective models, phenomenal concepts, independent roles, introspective opacity, immediate knowldge, primitive quality attri-bution, and primitive relation attribution. A lack of meta-consciousness can account for why we seem to have 'unconscious' states. Jan 1, 2021 · In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as "the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem" (Chalmers, 2018, p. Apr 27, 2022 · When we express our sense that it is a problem: “There is a hard problem of consciousness”, “It seems nonphysical”. Chalmers. uk Chalmers offers of problem reports include, ‘Consciousness is hard to explain’ (p. I learned a great deal from reading them and from thinking about how to reply. He is well-known for his work in the philosophy of mind, especially for his formulation of the “hard problem” of consciousness. François Kammerer) Abstract: The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. 13 The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we have the intuition that there is a hard problem of consciousness. 6). This argument is instead about what some call the “Meta Problem” of consciousness. If we had a solution to the hard problem, we would expect it to shed some light on the meta-problem. We review socio-historical factors that account for why, as a field, the neuroscience of consciousness has not been particularly successful at developing empirically adequate theories. A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. Those problem reports have no obvious explanation: the meta problem of consciousness is explaining those reports. 6 tion for why people find consciousness so puzzling? 7 Perhaps I am being too quick to equate the ‘problem intuitions’ with 8 the hard problem and the explanatory gap. Chalmers (Journal of Consciousness Studies 25: 6–61, 2018, 8) suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant light on the hard problem. The most promising solutions to the meta-problem reviewed by Chalmers The meta-problem of consciousness, according to David Chalmers, is (roughly) the problem of explaining why we think there is a problem of consciousness. The meta-problem of consciousness, introduced by David Chalmers, aims to explain why we perceive a problem with consciousness, offering a different approach that may dissolve the hard problem. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view The ambiguity of the term "consciousness" is often exploited by both philosophers and scientists writing on the subject. The main tenet of this approach is to explain our problematic phenomenal intuitions by putting our representations of phenomenal states in perspective within the larger frame of the cognitive processes we use to conceive of evidence. Illusionism proposes that consciousness is an illusion, challenging beliefs about consciousness through the meta-problem and facing opposition due to its Summary of Chapters 15-20 for the Casual Reader. Ned Block - 2003 - Disputatio 1 (15):4-49. Here, I show how the “hard problem” emerges Feb 13, 2023 · The meta-problem of consciousness . The hard problem of consciousness has multiple variations. Add to favourites Favourites: ADD. Chalmers(Journal ofConsciousnessStudies 25:6–61, 2018, 8) suggests that solving the meta-problem will likely “shed significant David Chalmers在2018年发表了哲学论文《意识的元问题》（The meta-problem of consciousness），这被视为心智哲学上的重要工作。 我将首先概述此文内容。 许多人都承认意识的“困难问题”的存在，即，如何解释我们用感官感受外界输入时所拥有的主观体验？ Jan 29, 2020 · David Chalmers is a philosopher and cognitive scientist specializing in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and consciousness. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining these reports. David J. Add more citations scientists writing on the subject. So any view that says there is phenomenal consciousness only in a sense where this is understood functionally is in effect a view where our ordinary (non-functionally The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. Evidence, Explanation, and Experience. 2019), studies on awareness and subjective experience were already being conducted in the late 19th century, at the inception of psychology as a scientific discipline, and continued throughout the 20th experience the higher or deeper states of consciousness postulated by these systems. We are realists about consciousness, like Chalmers. " Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 1(II) (2020) 10. As such, the meta-problem is exclusionary toward soft-wired illusionism. cesses give rise to consciousness. co. The initial problem is the hard problem of consciousness: why and how do physical processes in the brain illusionism meta-problem of consciousness immediate justification. Oct 24, 2024 · 1 Introduction. Marie Vandekerckhove & Jaak Panksepp - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):1018-1028. ii. The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why there seems to be a hard problem of consciousness. Apr 6, 2019 · David Chalmers is famous as the philosopher who coined the hard problem of consciousness, the idea that how and why consciousness is produced from a physical system, how phenomenal experience arises from such a system, is an intractably difficult issue. Equivalently, it is the problem of explain-ing why people have problem intuitions: dispositions to make certain key judgments that underlie the problem of consciousness. No References. Despite its scientific study has blossomed during the last three decades (Michel et al. Chapter 19: Self Awareness, Mary’s Room & The Meta Problem of Consciousness. This is the paper where I introduced the “hard problem” of consciousness. Chalmers introduces the 9 problem intuitions by appeal to the verbal reports that ordinary people 10 make about consciousness. , it has no causal impact on our behavior), the belief that there's something unusual about consciousness (the meta problem) cannot be justified solely by evolutionary mechanics, because holding the belief that something is sus about consciousness would not Apr 18, 2016 · David Chalmers is Professor of Philosophy and co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness at New York University, and also holds a part-time position at the Australian National University. I believe that their accumulated psychological material could help explain many aspects of the problem of consciousness and the meta-problem, if approached from the right angle and with an adequate explanatory framework. This is something that we need a big collaborative project on. Namely, there is no way, even in principle, to reduce the qualities of conscious experience to physical entities, which are purely quantitative. One of the problems with thinking about consciousness is that it’s been too 9 discussion of the meta-problem. He is perhaps best known for formulating the hard problem of consciousness which could be stated as “why does the feeling which accompanies awareness of sensory information exist at all?” This conversation is part of the Artificial Intelligence podcast. I distinguish between the easy problems and the hard problem, and I argue that the hard problem eludes conventional methods of explanation. 11), ‘I can’t see how consciousness could be physical’ (p. Here, the topic is clearly the hard problem May 22, 2020 · Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i. Seems easier than the hard problem, with close ties that could inform us about the hard "On the dangers of conflating strong and weak versions of a theory of consciousness. Think about when you have an epiphany. Understanding consciousness is one of the most exciting endeavors of human knowledge. The Meta-Problem of Consciousness The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. Editorial Introduction: Debates on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness. 62-73(12) Author: Diaz-Leon, E. The flow of anoetic to noetic and autonoetic consciousness: A vision of unknowing and knowing consciousness in the remembrance of things past and imagined futures. In this paper I argue that the key to understanding both consciousness itself and addressing the meta-problem is to understand what acquaintance is and what its objects are. If Sep 21, 2024 · Abstract. In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. Here I present what I think is the best approach to answer the meta-problem: the evidential approach. If consciousness is explained purely materialistically, you're rejecting hard problem, so the meta problem is actually the only problem. 12), and ‘Explaining behaviour does not explain consciousness’ (p. Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism, by Galen Strawson; The Meta-Problem of Consciousness, by David Since the problem of consciousness arises from a flawed theory of consciousness, pointing out the mechanisms underlying expression of the theory and the historical origins of the theory will not suffice to tell us why the theory is problematic. It is common to see a paper on consciousness begin with an invocation of the mystery of consciousness, noting the strange intangibility and ineffability of subjectivity, and worrying that so far we have no theory of the phenomenon. This has an unexpected resolution when one moves to 11 an interventionist account of scientific explanation: the same interventions that resolve the 12 hard problem should also resolve the meta-problem. About half of them discuss potential solutions to the meta-problem. At a first pass, we think that the meta-problem arises due to limited access to complex brain states, along with a false belief that The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Evidential Approach. At stake is how the physical body gives rise to subjective experience. Finding the biological basis of consciousness is sometimes considered as one of the major unsolved puzzles of contemporary science (Miller, 2005). 2020. If there's no hard problem, why do people think there's a hard problem? Jan 7, 2022 · PDF | On Jan 7, 2022, Michael Prost published The Meta-Problem of Philosophy and the Solution to the Hard Problem and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness | Find, read and cite all the research you . : The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy pp. Andrew Stark - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association :1-20. This paper introduces the Meta-Construct Problem of Consciousness, a novel extension of David Chalmers’ progression from the hard problem to the meta-problem of consciousness. The meta-problem is the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem, or in other terms, the prob-lem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain. 7). We suggest that the core of the meta-problem is the seeming 10 arbitrariness of subjective experience. François Kammerer - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):124-135. We are also materialists and naturalists (Barron and Klein, 2016), unlike Chalmers. Sciopartum, the book. Summary. Here, the topic is clearly the hard problem—the problem of experience. I would really like to see that get funded and I’d love to be involved with it. Illusionism provides one way in which the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem Dec 13, 2024 · A: The meta-problem of consciousness is a problem closely tied to the hard problem of consciousness, focusing on behavior and the challenges of understanding subjective experiences. However, philosophical arguments commonly subsumed as the “hard problem” of consciousness question the possibility of this endeavor, at least with respect to subjective experience (Chalmers, 1995). Nov 22, 2021 · The Meta-problem of consciousness Quotes from the interview [The meta-problem] is a hugely interdisciplinary thing. David Chalmers briefly notes that my phenomenal powers view may be able to answer to this challenge in a way that avoids problems (having to do with avoiding coincidence) facing other realist views. Added to PP 2020-05-21 Downloads 650 (#32,698) 6 months 95 (#59,500) Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3):200-19, 1995. I am grateful to the authors of the 39 commentaries on my article “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. ” Against this, I Mar 9, 2024 · The problem of explaining why we think we have mysterious conscious states, has been given a name and developed into a research program by philosopher David Chalmers, who calls it the meta-problem of consciousness. In the target article, I canvassed about 15 potential solutions to the meta-problem. Is meta-consciousness not just a subset of phenomenal consciousness? What is meta-consciousness if it's not also phenomenally conscious? Let me give you an example of the sort of unconscious mind I was talking about. By contrast, the hard problem and the The hard problem of consciousness and the meta-problem are closely connected. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a metatheory is a theory about theories, the metaproblem is a problem about a problem. The answer would involve heavy-duty metaphysical theorizing, probably including a commitment either to substance dualism or to the existence of a mysterious intrinsic subjectivity. By contrast, the hard problem and the 6 tion for why people find consciousness so puzzling? 7 Perhaps I am being too quick to equate the ‘problem intuitions’ with 8 the hard problem and the explanatory gap. Abstract I present and I implement what I take to be the best approach to solve the meta-problem: the evidential approach. 54; 8. (though I do ofcourse think consciousness is best explained by souls, but I’m not going to talk about that in this paper) The Meta-Problem of Consciousness. e. The harder problem of consciousness. One possibility is that the challenge arises from ontology—because consciousness is a special property/substance that is irreducible to the physical. We argue that emotions and the sense of self function as adaptive mechanisms Aug 30, 2021 · So the hard problem is actually hard for some approaches, for other approaches is in fact a non-problem. The meta problem more interesting from a materialist perspective than the hard problem itself. This argument does not require me to argue that. I address some adjacent issues, but the most common formulation simply claims that consciousness cannot be explained within a physicalist framework. In reverse, if we had a solution to the meta-problem, we should expect it to shed some light on the hard problem. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various featuresthatgiverisetothe hardproblem. In his paper, titled 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness', published last year in this journal, David Chalmers did a great service to the field of consciousness studies by laying down a Our “Cognitive Limitations” and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. In his "second approximation", he says it is the problem of explaining the behavior of " phenomenal reports", and the behavior of expressing a belief that there is a hard problem of consciousness. Meta-ethics: Metaphysics: Normative ethics: Aug 11, 2023 · Abstract. This paper challenges long-held beliefs about consciousness and selfhood, proposing that these phenomena—far from being intrinsic or metaphysical—are evolved survival tools. The meta-problem gets its name from the fact that it is a problem about a problem: it is the problem of explaining why we think we core of what Chalmers calls the meta-problem of consciousness. At the same time, a solution will almost certainly have consequences for the hard problem of consciousness. 1 The commentaries divide fairly nearly into about three groups. There are reasons why this may seem intuitive to some, but modern evidence and academic consensus suggest otherwise. This has been termed the meta problem of consciousness, meaning the reasons some think there is any hard problem at all 2. Q: How is the hard problem of consciousness different from the easy problems? The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a [hard] problem of consciousness. *B Odegaard, RT Knight, H Lau. Reprint years. : "A socio-historical take on the meta-problem of consciousness" Journal of consciousness studies 26 (9-10), 136-147 (2019) 9. Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61 (2018) Abstract The intuition that consciousness is hard to explain may fade away as empirically adequate theories of consciousness develop. 33735/phimisci. The meta-problem. See full list on imprint. reports to the effect that phenomenal consciousness has the various features that give rise to the hard problem. May 25, 2022 · Introduction. Philosopher David Chalmers elucidated the hard problem of consciousness in 1995. Two Caveats to the Meta NOTE: I am not saying that consciousness itself disproves atheism/materialism. The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness. Chalmers sees between the hard problem and the meta-problem: ‘Whatever explains consciousness (the hard problem) should also play a central role in explaining our judgments about consciousness If our ordinary concepts of consciousness were functional concepts, then there would be no hard problem of consciousness, or at least the problem would be much easier to dismiss. *H Lau, M Michel. Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. According to Chalmers (2018), the meta-problem of consciousness is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness'. About a quarter of them discuss the question of whether intuitions about In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers presents the meta-problem of consciousness: the problem of explaining phenomenal intuitions in a topic-neutral way. Analytics. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a meta-theory is a theory about theories, the meta-problem is a problem about a problem. Why consciousness is “hard”, however, is uncertain. 1 Just as metacognition is cognition about cognition, and a metatheory is a theory about theo-ries, the metaproblem is a problem about a problem. Chalmers’ meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining “problem reports”; i. Forthcoming in Journal of Consciousness Studies (symposium on David Chalmers’ “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, ed. You argue that in a deterministic world where consciousness is an epiphenomenon (i. The meta-problem is strictly speaking an easy problem, and solving it is a tractable empirical project for cognitive scientists. afwkzu pvidor tsqha grgsg bfq igpgu abylk mree vgql rwrn
Meta problem of consciousness summary. May 25, 2022 · Introduction.
